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From Neo-Enlightenment to Nihonjinron: 
The Politics of Anti-Multiculturalism 
in Japan and the Netherlands
Jack Eisenberg
All communities are postulated; projects rather than realities, 
something that becomes after, not before the individual choice.
Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity
I. Introduction
On September 6, 2007, politician Geert Wilders addressed the Dutch 
Parliament, boldly proclaiming that “multiculturalism” was destroy-
ing European civilization:
Madam Speaker, the Islamic incursion must be stopped. Islam is the 
Trojan Horse in Europe. If we do not stop Islamification now, Eurabia 
and Netherabia will just be a matter of time. One century ago, there were 
approximately 50 Muslims in the Netherlands. Today, there are about 
one million Muslims in this country. Where will it end?…No Islamic tra-
dition must ever be established in the Netherlands: not now and also not 
in a few centuries’ time.1
Only a few years earlier and several thousand miles away on the 
island of Japan, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro warned the Japa-
nese public about the imminent threat foreigners posed to their social 
fabric after relaying a recent report of criminal activity:
In due course, the perpetrators were captured, and, just as had been sus-
pected, the crime was one of revenge among Chinese criminals. There is 
fear—and not without cause—that it will not be long before the entire 
nature of Japanese society itself will be altered by the spread of this type 
of crime that is indicative of their ethnic DNA.2
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In both cases, the total eclipse of multiculturalism was more than 
political. It was existential.
While many view globalization as a process fundamentally reshap-
ing the way individuals, communities, and nation-states interact, the 
emergent patterns of social and political order are unclear and often 
contradictory. Between the neo-Marxist critics and neo-liberal advo-
cates of what is to come, a contentious debate centers on how poli-
cies, discourses, and social movements within democracies react to 
heightened cultural interaction as a consequence of global migration 
patterns. As the past ten years have witnessed a resurgence of nation-
alist sentiments in several advanced industrialized countries, the fol-
lowing questions have emerged. How is political xenophobia justified 
to the general public? What are the relationships between these politi-
cal movements in separate countries and their perceptions of “mul-
ticulturalism” and “difference”? What are their social consequences? 
Finally, how do we understand political nationalism in the broader 
context of globalization?
This essay seeks to critically analyze discourses of xenophobia and 
clarify their relationship to perceptions of multiculturalism in the com-
parative context of Japan and the Netherlands. These two advanced 
industrialized countries have very distinct historical traditions in deal-
ing with immigrant populations, with the Netherlands considered one 
of the most accommodating to foreigners and Japan one of the most 
resistant to outsiders. Yet recently politicians in both countries have 
justified hostility to foreigners along similar lines. I refer to the use 
of these specific discourses as the politics of anti-multiculturalism. This 
study makes two comparative conclusions: first, given the great dif-
ferences in their respective identitarian myths, xenophobic political 
movements in both cases are fundamentally the same in their hostility 
to difference and methods of justification. Second, this essay critiques 
political anti-multiculturalism for mischaracterizing the realities of 
immigration and exacerbating intercultural tensions in an era of seem-
ingly irreversible global flows of people.
The article is organized in six parts. First, I outline the broader theo-
retical context of globalization and its sub-themes of identity and mul-
ticulturalism, and I justify comparing these two particular countries 
in light of their similarities and differences. Second, I briefly explain 
my methodologies of discourse analysis and field interviews. Third 
and fourth, I look at the respective stories behind Dutch and Japanese 
nationalist politicians in the historical context of immigration poli-
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cies, and critically analyze their anti-multicultural discourses. Fifth, I 
draw comparative conclusions based on both common justifications 
and common social consequences. Lastly, I return to the theme of glo-
balization and conclude with several remarks about the significance of 
understanding anti-multiculturalism.
II. Theoretical Context
Globalization, in its broadest sense, is the contemporary catchword for 
change. A seemingly endless number of articles and books on the topic 
dot the landscape, but most commentators agree that deep changes are 
afoot. The units of analysis vary from NGOs to transnational corpora-
tions, from nation-states to city councils, from forms of government 
to mechanisms of governance, but most means of uncovering what 
indeed is changing and how new normative potentials can be har-
nessed or suppressed vary from place to place, from person to person. 
Some see change for everyone, others only for some. Shaw defines glo-
balization, or “globality,” in terms of a shift in something as axiomatic 
as the intersubjectivity of the world population:
I propose that we understand this as the development of a common con-
sciousness of human society on a world scale. We mean an increasing aware-
ness of the totality of human social relations as the largest constitutive 
framework of all relations…The distinction between global and pre-
global is therefore that, with the development of global relations, the 
understanding of human relations in a common worldwide framework 
comes to predominate over other, more partial understandings.3
Of course, as resurgent nationalism and xenophobia demonstrate, 
Shaw’s globality is never as simple as the spread of a global ethic or 
consciousness, even in the wealthiest parts of the world. If anything, 
national identities and globality engage each other in a dynamic, dia-
lectical process. The meaning of any supposed global moment rests on 
where one’s place is to begin with. As Zygmunt Bauman remarks:
An integral part of the globalizing process is progressive spatial segre-
gation, separation and exclusion. Neo-tribal and fundamentalist ten-
dencies, which reflect and articulate the experience of people on the 
receiving end of globalization, are as much the legitimate offspring of 
globalization as the widely acclaimed ‘hybridization’ of top culture—the 
culture at the globalized top.4
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With the varied experiences of globality in mind, my analysis of 
political nationalism and xenophobia draws from and extends into two 
highly contested sub-themes of globalization: identity and multicultur-
alism.
A. Essentialism and Beyond: Rethinking Identity as Politics
Before understanding nationalism and xenophobia, it is necessary to 
see how identity has been rethought, given the degree to which people 
with differences increasingly interact. The theoretical literature and 
empirical realities of globalization have led to divergent views. Some 
answer with “essentialism,” describing the idea that there is an inher-
ent “essence” to identity, be it in ethnic, national, cultural, or value-
based terms. Samuel Huntington serves as one example, arguing that 
core identities can be classified along discrete lines “defined by com-
mon objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs, 
institutions, and the subjective self-identification of the people.”5 To 
him, identity is composed of qualities that can be preserved through 
culturally protectionist policies.
On the other side of the spectrum, some argue that a supposed 
essence of identity is a constructed manifestation of something inher-
ently hybridized and seemingly infinite. Badiou summarizes this view 
of identity in his conception of “multiplicity”: “There are as many dif-
ferences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a young Norwegian pro-
fessional as between myself and anyone at all, including myself.”6 In 
other words, for Badiou and others like him, when it comes to identity, 
nothing can be taken for granted.
The aim of this analysis is to promote a more reflexive account of 
national forms of identity by looking into the political implications of 
these debates. As will be discussed later, not only do Dutch and Japa-
nese populists employ essentialist views of identity to support their 
claims, but they also depict its bleak alternative as a deracinated “mul-
tiplicity” that has no common history or culture to relate its citizens 
and is likely to collapse into chaos. I hope to illustrate that nationalism 
today stands diametrically opposed to hybridity.
B. Globalization’s Challenge to Democracy: (Anti)multiculturalism
Increasing intercultural interaction as a consequence of continued 
migration patterns has made the term multiculturalism a prime tar-
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get of academic discussions. Multiculturalism is indeed a semantically 
promiscuous and often misused concept, but nevertheless provides 
an important framework for understanding how democracy and dif-
ference are and can be related. Perspectives differ in terms of how 
individual rights and group claims can be reconciled through theories 
of justice and forms of governance in poly-ethnic societies. The major 
question underlying most debates about integration and immigration 
is to what extent minority cultures have the right to be protected from 
disintegration and absorption into the dominant one. Will Kymlicka 
defends the right of minority and majority cultures to exist because cul-
ture precedes freedom: “Put simply, freedom involves making choices 
amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides 
these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.”7 His argument 
follows that choosing to access or abandon culture must be a right 
guaranteed by governments, as it provides the necessary foundation 
for self-identification and the relationship to peers.
The debate becomes complicated, however, when liberal individual 
rights are seen as conflicting with communal or cultural ones. Some 
continue to place cultural rights over individual ones. Freemen con-
tends that, “Multiculturalism prescribes a policy not just of toleration, 
but also accommodation of disparate cultural groups, many of which 
do not endorse liberal social or even political norms.”8 This belief leads 
many critics to argue that multiculturalism is nothing more than a 
philosophical justification for cultural relativism. Specifically, Barry 
attacked its “communitarian” underpinnings and suggests that only 
liberal egalitarian principles can remain relevant in a theory of social 
justice because illiberal groups cannot ensure individual rights.9
While many questions remain unresolved, this essay extends the 
debate into a different direction. Rather than discuss multiculturalism 
only in terms of theories of justice and its relationship to liberalism, 
I look into the social and political dynamics involved in absolutely 
rejecting a multicultural society. The term anti-multiculturalism thus 
refers to the belief that difference can only be constructed and viewed 
in purely negative terms, and that minority cultures should not coexist 
alongside majority ones. Anti-multiculturalism is different from multi-
culturalism in that the former attempts in policies of immigration and 
integration to eliminate difference, while the latter allows for qualified, 
pragmatic responses.
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C. Nationalism Beyond the West: The Promise of a Comparative 
Analysis
Comparing the specific countries of Japan and the Netherlands along 
the lines of political xenophobia is important for a number of rea-
sons. First, looking at their similarities forces a rethinking of resur-
gent nationalism as a Western phenomenon. Indeed, much literature 
on populism and xenophobia reduces anti-immigration and the cre-
ation of a “fortress” society to common American or European traits.10 
Certainly at first glance the case of the Netherlands supports many 
of these claims. Priding itself as being among the birthplaces of the 
Enlightenment, scholars on all sides of the spectrum argue that the 
Netherlands has consistently been a bedrock of the Western liberal 
values of tolerance, rationality, and “civilization,” and its history of art 
and philosophy are often attributed quintessential “Western” traits.11 
Moreover, some view it as one of the first countries to develop the 
capitalist social relations often associated with Westernization. On 
the other hand, Japan defies many of these “Western” cultural traits. 
Unique Japanese characteristics extend to aspects as fundamental as 
social individuation, systems of ethics, emotional configurations, and 
ontological assumptions concerning a human-nature duality.12 While 
some might argue that Japan became Western in its project of modern-
ization, in actuality those in charge of this project during the Meiji Res-
toration described it as “transcending modernity” (kindai no chokoku) 
and its Western categories.13
Stepping outside of the conceptual cage of the West forces a recon-
textualization of this analysis into the broader intersections of political 
economy, national discourses, and global migration patterns. From a 
political economy perspective, it is critical to note that the two coun-
tries share certain similar characteristics. The Netherlands and Japan 
remain two of the wealthiest countries in the world. Both are members 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
Netherlands’ GDP per capita is $38,600 and Japan’s is $33,800, and 
unemployment is well below five percent in both cases.14 Each can 
be considered post-industrial, with 73.8% and 73.3% of all jobs in the 
service sector, respectively,15 and the technological achievement index 
placing the Netherlands at sixth most advanced and Japan as fourth.16 
Politically, both countries are formally Constitutional monarchies but 
act as Parliamentary democracies, as national and local elections deter-
mine which parties will constitute the ruling coalition. Certainly differ-
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ences exist in respective party politics, but general procedures remain 
fundamentally alike. Moreover, contemporary research on the style of 
politics suggests that the media presence of political figures now plays 
an important role in determining electoral patterns.17 The example 
of populist politicians in both countries supports this claim. In other 
words, one of the aims of this comparison is to show that political 
xenophobia is not only a Western phenomenon, but is one of the many 
faces of globalization.
III. Political Words and their Consequences
The term discourse has become more and more commonplace in aca-
demia as either a method (discourse analysis) or to describe a mecha-
nism of power relations. Underpinning discourse analysis is the idea 
that language is not a neutral tool to mediate external reality, but 
actively serves to give reality part or all of its meaning.18 This essay 
will use discourse analysis in an attempt to unravel the inner logic 
of political xenophobia and how the specific language employed by 
political actors actively draws lines between “foreign” and “domestic” 
elements of social life. In particular, I will look at the arguments made 
in favor of preserving national identity against outside people and 
ideas. However, discourse analysis must not be limited to language 
itself, but must also look at its social effects. As Bauman notes, “it is the 
behavioral and political consequences that count and affect the quality 
of human cohabitation, not the words used to narrate them.”19 Thus, 
while one part of this article analyzes the logic of political arguments, 
the other draws on field interviews with immigrants and empirical 
evidence to look into effects on the larger society.
IV. Cases
A. The Neo-Enlightenment in the Netherlands
While many mark the radical politics of anti-multiculturalism on the 
Dutch political scene as a “seismic shift”20 in its historical record of 
immigration and integration policies, it is first necessary to sort through 
the often-romanticized Dutch history of tolerance and to understand 
the story as one of both continuity and change.
Immigration played an important role in post-war Holland. The 
Dutch government began recruitment of low-skilled labor from coun-
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tries in the Mediterranean in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1973, however, 
recruitment came to a virtual standstill because of the overabundance 
of unemployed natives and a decreased demand for unskilled labor as 
a result of the global oil crisis.21 Even though the government expected 
migrant workers to return home, immigration continued for three rea-
sons. First, the government permitted family reunification and also 
continued a “back door” immigration policy through the Foreign 
Workers Employment Act (1979). Second, about 180,000 colonial immi-
grants arrived in the wake of Surinam’s independence. Third, asylum 
seekers continued to grow in numbers, reaching 50,000 applicants at 
its peak in 1994.22 As a result, there were large increases in immigrant 
population. Out of the two largest ethnic groups, Turkish nationals 
grew from 53,500 in 1974 to 308,000 in 2000 and Moroccan nationals 
from 29,600 to 262,000.23
Most mainstream accounts of the Netherlands view the country as 
one of the most accommodating toward foreigners. Originally, Dutch 
models for integration grew out of its system of verzuiling, or “Pillar-
ization,” which organized self-autonomous social groups based upon 
denomination. Its political corollary, the Polder Model, was a “conso-
ciational” democracy that allowed the major subgroups of Protestants, 
Catholics, and socialists to facilitate political decisions between elites of 
each group.24 Typically evolving out of pragmatic adjustments to real-
ity, Dutch post-war policies of immigration were based on these Pillar 
and Polder idealtyps. The idea of an ethnic minority pillar is best repre-
sented by the government’s 1983 White Paper, which promoted three 
objectives: to improve the socioeconomic conditions of minorities, to 
counteract discrimination and improve the legal position of specific 
minority groups, and to increase minority participation in Dutch soci-
ety.25 In short, stereotypical depictions of the Dutch integration model 
emphasize the cultural autonomy of ethnic and religious minorities.
While these policies typically presented the Netherlands as a “har-
monic multicultural society,” many critics point out its organizational 
flaws. Vink argues that the creation of an ethnic minorities pillar was 
more of a myth than a reality, and government policies never per-
mitted new religious groups to integrate in the same way old ones 
had.26 Government policies addressing cultural autonomy grew out 
of the belief that foreigners would eventually leave the country; when 
the government realized immigrants would stay, they quickly favored 
integration measures over cultural autonomy.27 Entzinger suggests that 
Dutch multiculturalism had a static view of culture, and that policies 
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were aimed more at protecting “traditional Dutch values from outside 
impulses” than creating new channels for dynamic interaction between 
newcomers and old residents.28
Fact or fiction, the reality was that large groups of immigrant popu-
lations had begun to settle into Dutch society. It became the topic of 
political discourse in the 21st century.
1. Enter Pim Fortuyn
The story of Dutch immigration and integration policies may be one of 
both continuity and change, but a post-9/11 world saw the radicaliza-
tion of anti-multiculturalist discourse in the politics of Pim Fortuyn. 
Fortuyn burst the cracks in the pillarization model in his run up to the 
2002 Parliamentary elections, attacking political elites and leading a 
strong campaign against immigration. Fortuyn announced his inten-
tion to run for Parliament on August 20, 2001. He decided to be leader 
of the Livable Netherlands Party and quickly adopted the slogan, “at 
your service.” Drawing from his bestselling book, The Mess of Eight 
Purple Years,29 he used his “pink” platform to attack the ruling “purple” 
coalition. Fortuyn’s agenda centered around two issues: restructuring 
the public sector and taking a firmer stance on immigration policies, 
particularly regarding asylum seekers. Once on the political scene, he 
immediately offered a polarizing voice on the latter issue, saying in de 
Volksrant that, “Islam was a backwards culture, and no new immigrants 
would be allowed, and that if necessary to protect freedom of speech, 
the first article of the Constitution30 should be repealed.”31 Because of 
this controversial statement, the Livable Netherlands Party dismissed 
Fortuyn, but he quickly formed his own party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF), to continue campaigning and making bold remarks about Islam 
in the Netherlands. His story was cut short, however. On May 6, 2002, 
he was assassinated. Nine days later, Fortuyn’s party won 26 seats in 
the Parliament, a record number of seats for a new party. According to 
the Pedersen index, the elections of May 15, 2002 ranked fourth among 
all Western European elections since 190032 in terms of voter volatility.
Fortuyn’s success presented an important link between national-
ism and anti-elitism. General descriptions have often referred to him 
as a populist. This explains why, for example, he directed his com-
ments to “general Dutch people” against the legacy left by “elites in 
The Hague.” Canovan has argued that when populism refers to “the 
people” or a “homeland,” the political platform can quite often be 
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turned into a nationalist project.33 Yet, to call Fortuyn a nationalist is 
not precise enough to describe his values. Akkerman used a typology 
of nationalism to classify Fortuyn’s party program as “civic national-
ism.” Civic nationalism, according to Akkerman, differs from “ethno-
cratic nationalism” because Fortuyn’s vision was more utopian than 
nostalgic.34
While Fortuyn’s party success was short-lived, much debate remains 
over his role as a leader in shaping the public opinion of foreigners. 
Some argue that many people voted for his party as a vote against the 
ruling coalition more than a vote for his platform. Others contend that 
Fortuyn actually served to form new perceptions of foreigners and was 
the main catalyst in creating anti-immigration sentiment. According to 
a study done by Belanger and Aarts, it was a combination of the two. 
Fortuyn’s party success was due to both policy preferences and previ-
ous attitudes of political discontent.35 Regardless, by the time of the 
elections, he presented a new set of arguments against immigration 
and Islam in particular, and his appeal has unquestionably left a resid-
ual impact on Dutch politics and its political treatment of difference. 
Importantly, Fortuyn based his vision on a historical reconstruction of 
the Western Enlightenment.
2. Fortuyn’s Neo-Enlightenment and its Heirs
Looking at specific arguments and statements, Fortuyn’s Neo-Enlight-
enment discourse can be broken into four different components: iden-
tifying core liberal values, reducing Islam to a homogeneous culture, 
perceiving Islam as the prime threat to liberal values, and linking the 
political elite to an impotent form of cultural relativism.
First, Fortuyn argued that the Netherlands arrived at its liberal value 
system through the evolutionary Enlightenment process whose core 
principles were secularity and tolerance. His book, The Islamization 
of the Netherlands, argued that Islam was a threat to the separation of 
church and state. He contended that it is vital that, “the public domain 
is protected from the direct influences of ideology.”36 To defend the 
principles of the secular Enlightenment, Fortuyn called on Dutch peo-
ple to become “self-aware of our norms and values.” He urged their 
defense, declaring, “We must pass on these norms and values…I am 
talking about core norms and values.” Because Fortuyn invoked wom-
en’s and homosexual’s rights as core values, he linked leftist ethical val-
ues with civic nationalism. Ironically, he acted as a living embodiment 
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of tolerance as he was openly gay and claimed to have good sexual 
relations with Muslim immigrants. When asked in an interview why 
he neglected to spend time with immigrants despite his policies, his 
response was, “spend time with them? I sleep with Muslim boys!”37 
Fortuyn’s charisma and ability to complicate the traditional values of 
the right and left with immigration and nationalism granted him a 
wide appeal. It also allowed him to distance himself from conventional 
rightist or racist accusations because of his approving stance toward 
domestic ethical issues such as euthanasia and abortion.
Second, Fortuyn based the fault lines between Dutch society and 
Muslims on culture. In an interview he gave right before the election, 
Fortuyn made the remarks, “Legally, all religions are equal. Culturally 
they are not.” This had two effects: it reduced Muslim immigrants to a 
homogenous ethnic group despite great internal variations, and it cre-
ated an unclear conflation of religion and culture. Turkish immigrants 
were grouped with Moroccan immigrants, for example, even though 
they have had significantly different experiences in integrating into 
Dutch society.38 Also, this prevented Islam from being seen in its varied 
religious experience across immigrant generations. While first-gen-
eration hermeneutical perspectives may vary from second- and third-
generation ones, this promoted a black-and-white view of the Muslim 
religion. The message to the general public suggests that one is either 
completely secular and “capable” in Dutch society or one is devoutly 
religious and fundamentally incompatible with Western values.
Third, Fortuyn turned his cultural construction of Islam into the 
primary threat to core liberal values. This can be seen in remarks he 
gave at a press conference immediately before his assassination: “I 
want to discuss and if necessary fight the Islam by just saying that 
our standards and values…are different than theirs. In some points 
they are totally opposite to each other…yes I think that [it] is retarded, 
that’s what I said.” He contrasted Islam to liberal values by claiming it 
cannot “wholly participate” in Dutch culture unless it can assimilate 
these liberal qualities. The failure to integrate Muslims was because 
their faith had not yet been through the phase of the Enlightenment.39 
Invoking examples of the oppression of women in Muslim societies, 
Fortuyn was able to create a public belief that intolerance within the 
Muslim community was not only commonplace, but had the potential 
to contaminate the values of Dutch society as well.
Fourth, Fortuyn invoked claims of a democratic deficit to rouse sup-
port. His populist critique attached cultural relativism to elite values. 
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Pim Fortuyn once justified his claims by critiquing the Far Left for dis-
abling critical remarks toward non-Dutch ethnic groups:
The extreme left—the greens and the pvdA, plus their henchmen in 
the civil service and media—have tried to suppress, via the subsidized 
thought police, and the increased number of anti-racist committees, all 
critique of the blessings of a multicultural society.40
This line of argument feeds back into the populist characteristics 
described earlier, and helps explain much of his initial electoral sup-
port. Fortuyn demonized the ruling coalition not because of economic 
problems, but because they represented the paralyzing consequences 
of “political correctness.” Fortuyn led many to believe that a politically 
correct Left stifled individual expression and thought. Logically, he 
was able to link many ideas at once: elites no longer spoke on behalf 
of the general public but tried to force their own values onto society, 
and they had used their power to ensure that no one would challenge 
their rule unless a savior like himself stood up to them. This also 
allowed Fortuyn to turn his anti-immigrant platform into a campaign 
with larger implications about the state of democracy in the Nether-
lands. Along his line of argument, a vote against him would be a vote 
against democratic principles. The BBC issued a general survey about 
Fortuyn’s popularity following his death, and one man noted, “There 
was much more to Fortuyn than his views on immigration.”41
Although Fortuyn’s party broke up in chaos shortly after its triumph 
and despite his assassination, the ideas remain politically active. Geert 
Wilders is one of the most outspoken and controversial critics of Islam 
to come out of the legacy of anti-multiculturalism. Wilders’ anti-Islamic 
language is even stronger than that of Fortuyn, but he employs almost 
the exact same tactics that Fortuyn pioneered in his neo-Enlightenment 
discourse. In an interview he gave on the Fox News channel after the 
release of his movie Fitna, he stated:
The Koran is a fascist book. Islam is an ideology…The adrenaline 
through my veins is that I feel a lot of support in my country to make 
a change and be proud of identity, not to be xenophobe or racist, but 
to speak out against an ideology that is threatening everything in the 
Western world…We are still cultural relativists to the bone, and the gov-
ernment is politically correct, and the large amount of people who live in 
my country are fed up with it.42
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Wilders reiterates the strikingly similar general principles: attacking 
the elites for cultural relativism, charging Islam as the prime oppo-
nent of Western civilization, appealing to “the people,” and attempting 
to preserve a core-value-based identity. Wilders continues to use the 
media as his main vehicle for anti-Islamic remarks, and although he 
has many critics in both the Netherlands and other places, his appeal is 
not dwindling. As of now his party controls 9 of 150 seats in the Parlia-
ment.
Former Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk also represents a part of 
Fortuyn’s essentialist and preservationist legacy. Verdonk responded to 
the changing political climate by instituting new regulations regarding 
asylum seekers and integration measures. In 2005, she turned down 
the applications of more than 26,000 refugees who had been living in 
the Netherlands for over five years. She proposed that all women who 
wish to wear the Muslim headscarf or burqa would be banned from 
public spaces because they were a threat to national security, and that 
only the Dutch language could be spoken outside of private homes.43 
The conservative VVD Party took away her membership in September 
of 2007 after she criticized it for having too little visibility on the issues 
of immigration and integration. Verdonk has since started her own 
party, Proud of the Netherlands. According to her website, two prin-
ciples that immigrants must abide by include Dutch language learning 
as well as “in public space, [using] only Dutch values and norms.”44 
Her popularity does not appear to be diminishing. A recent poll by 
Maurice de Hond shows that the Proud Netherlands Party of Verdonk 
would pick up 26 seats in the next Parliamentary election.45
B. Nihonjinron in Japan
Before looking into the radical politics of Ishihara Shintaro, it is nec-
essary to understand the historical context of Japan and its attitude 
toward outsiders. Japan has long been characterized as a country 
resistant to foreigners and tolerant of racist rhetoric.46 Some argue 
that Japan’s slow adaptation to immigration and integration policies 
is because the country relied on long work hours and automation 
instead of foreign unskilled labor during its period of post-war eco-
nomic growth.47 Still others have argued that immigration occurred 
after the post-war boom, but through irregular and undocumented 
measures, because the government made a conscious effort not to deal 
with the illegal influx of workers.48 Nevertheless, in the 1980s, increas-
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ing demand for foreign labor led to a larger influx of foreigners from 
South and East Asia and South America, and by the turn of this cen-
tury, 1,686,444 registered immigrants resided in the country.49
According to a United Nation’s report in 2000, Japan’s total work-
force is expected to contract by 13% by 2025 as a result of having the 
world’s lowest fertility rate. This prediction has forced much debate 
within the country, not only about the need for foreign labor, but also 
about its political and social stance on outsiders.
Japan’s attitude toward foreigners in its immigration policy can be 
broken into three restrictive ideas: first, admitting foreign workers on 
any basis should be a last resort; second, unskilled workers should 
not be admitted; and third, all foreigners should be admitted on a 
temporary basis only.50 While laws such as the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Act have been amended several times, Japan’s ban on 
unskilled labor and severe punishment of illegal aliens remains firmly 
rooted. Consequently, a side-door mechanism emerged for import-
ing unskilled labor by expanding “trainee programs” and allowing 
greater flexibility in visa categories. The trainee program allows work-
ers to come to Japan under the justification that they will learn techni-
cal skills and then return to their country of origin. From the 1990s 
onward, the number of trainees has ranged anywhere from 40,000 to 
55,00 entrants per year.51 In reality, many trainees receive little train-
ing and actually perform jobs that native Japanese will not perform 
because they are dirty, dangerous, or low-paying. Along with its side-
door, Japan also has a relatively accessible back door, namely, illegally 
overstaying visa permits or underground trafficking channels. The 
government attempted to crack down on the number of over-stayers 
in the early 1990s by making it harder to obtain a visa from targeted 
countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Even after these measures, 
the estimated number of visa over-stayers is approximately 250,000, 
not counting the considerable number of people who enter the country 
clandestinely.52
The responsibility for immigration and integration policies contin-
ues to bounce between different ministries in the central government. 
Immigration control is in the hands of the Ministry of Justice, but 
lacks any jurisdiction over integration policy. Other ministries, such as 
Health, Labor, and Welfare, control the restrictions on visa and work 
permits, but usually leave the provision of services (such as language-
learning facilities) to local governments and NGOs. Ultimately, the 
lack of a centralized bureaucracy to deal comprehensively with immi-
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gration and integration has prevented any systematic policy to address 
both the economic reality of unskilled labor and the growing number 
of illegal residents in the country. This has allowed politicians to cap-
ture the public imagination about the uncertainty of Japan’s status as 
an immigrant country.
1. The Popular Face of Nationalism: Ishihara Shintaro
Given Japan’s history of immigration, its political climate deserves 
special attention in light of a popular and powerful individual and 
his explicit remarks against foreigners. Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara 
Shintaro represents some of the most extreme views against a mul-
ticultural Japan. Shintaro has been a well-known figure in Japanese 
pop culture and politics for a long time. At age 23, he won the presti-
gious Akutagawa Literature Award for his novel, The Season of the Sun. 
Using this literary fame he entered politics in 1968 and was elected 
to eight consecutive terms in the House of Councillors, serving in the 
environment and transport ministries. In 1989, he published another 
controversial bestselling book titled, No to ieru Nihon (The Japan that 
Can Say No), with Sony co-founder Morita Akio. In it he argued for 
Japan’s need to be independent from the United States in its foreign 
and domestic policy. After twenty-five years, Ishihara decided to retire 
from politics, lamenting that Japan had been reduced to the “level of 
eunuch.”53 This political hiatus was short-lived, however, when he 
announced his candidacy for Governor of Tokyo in 1999, just days 
before official campaigning began.
Ishihara immediately won support from the general public because 
he was seen as a fresh face, one that would be different from the monot-
ony of party politics that had taken shape over the course of the past 
few decades in post-war Japan. While he was once a member of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), his departure from its roster in 1995 
symbolized a break from its bureaucratic and decreasingly popular 
ways. He ran as an independent, despite the LDP urging him not to 
enter the elections against the field of other candidates they supported. 
Using his connections in the film industry, Ishihara hired a well-known 
production team to help with his campaign, and he frequently made 
bold statements about his role, proclaiming that he would lead a “rev-
olution against the central government.”54 He tapped into national 
pride by deriding Japan’s two largest diplomatic partners, China and 
the United States, saying that old-style politicians had become too 
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“timid” in the face of international pressures. He claimed that he rep-
resented a Japanese identity: “I have a unity with Japan in my body.”55 
He pledged to return the U.S. Air Base in Yokota to Japan, and openly 
declared his hatred for China after declining to attend the twentieth 
anniversary of Beijing’s and Tokyo’s sister-city relationship.56 He sug-
gested that Beijing’s accounts of the Nanjing massacre were largely 
fabricated and proffered that its human rights violations in Tibet were 
unacceptable.
Ishihara Shintaro won twice as many votes in the 1999 election as 
his nearest rival, with 30% of the total vote. According to an exit poll 
by Asahi Shinbun, Ishihara’s independent status and nationalist project 
earned him 41% of voters who typically voted for the LDP, 20% of vot-
ers who supported the DPJ (Japan’s second largest party), and 27% of 
unaffiliated voters.57 He has since been re-elected to a second term in 
2003, with a victory of more than 70% of the votes, and then a third 
term in April of 2007. After his landslide victory in 2003, there was a 
large amount of speculation that he would be the successor to Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, although these plans have yet to come 
to fruition.58 Given his increasing popularity and public appeal, it is 
important to critically interrogate the specifics behind his radical anti-
multicultural approach.
2. Ishihara and the Legacy of Nihonjinron
Ishihara’s politicization of Japanese national identity can be broken 
into four different components: all immigrants are criminals, foreign-
ers can be distinguished from each other by ethnicity and the types of 
crime they will commit, Japan is an ethnically homogenous culture 
that will self-destruct if it is not consciously preserved, and most old-
style elites in the central government have failed to stand up for a Japa-
nese identity.
The first and most explicit mechanism used to justify xenophobia 
and anti-multiculturalism is the construction of immigrants as crimi-
nals. Shintaro’s critique of foreigners extends to all cultures, including 
Americans, but generally the targets of his sweeping generalizations 
are illegal workers. In a speech given to the Japanese Defense Force in 
April of 2000, he explained:
With Sangokujin [Third world people] and foreigners repeating serious 
crimes, we should prepare ourselves for possible riots that may be insti-
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gated by them at the outbreak of an earthquake. As police are not always 
fit for handling all contingencies, the Self-Defense forces should be ready 
to respond to threats to public security besides natural disasters.59
In his view, immigrants are so dangerous to Japanese society that they 
should be rounded up in the event of a national emergency. Even 
though these remarks caused a large amount of international contro-
versy (the United Nations conducted a special examination of discrim-
ination and racism in Japan shortly afterwards), a survey conducted 
by TBS radio suggested that 87% of Japanese callers less than a week 
afterwards supported his comments.60 The construction of immigrants 
as “dangerous” is part of a time-honored governmental tradition of 
shaping the Japanese public imagination. Often Ishihara “substanti-
ates” his claims by manipulating statistics issued by the NPA, or Japa-
nese police agency, on foreigner crime. These statistics usually depict 
immigrant crime as on the rise, even though the percentage of native 
Japanese criminality far exceeds their foreign counterparts, and the 
reporting of immigrant crime is far more commonplace.61 The implica-
tions are quite clear: foreigners are criminals by definition.
Second, as an extension of the construction of immigrants as crimi-
nals, they are also differentiated from each other based upon ethnicity. 
Ishihara unapologetically applies these markers to generalize about 
the types of crime they commit. Chinese are largely grouped under the 
categories of organized prostitution and mafia activities; Iranians are 
typically viewed as drug dealers; and people of African descent can be 
seen as the most hostile in that their actions are erratic and unpredict-
able. While the largest groups of criminals are Chinese and Iranians, 
Ishihara remarked that Africans are among the least trustworthy:
Why don’t you go to Roppongi? It’s now virtually a foreign neighbor-
hood. Africans—I don’t mean African-Americans—who don’t speak 
English are there doing who knows what. This is leading to new forms 
of crime. We should be letting in people who are intelligent.62
Ishihara’s views coincide with the central government’s views of 
foreigners in its immigration and integration policies created for dif-
ferent “types” of workers, which vary according to nationality. Legal 
documentation, for example, is correlated with place of origin: resident 
Koreans obtain “permanent resident” status, while Chinese, Filipino, 
and Thai workers enter under “trainee” or “entertainer” visas. Work-
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ers from Southeast Asia are usually given “temporary visitor” status, 
and Iranian men had no visa requirement at all until 1993. The end 
result of these policies creates a racialized hierarchy in which different 
ethnic groups obtain different kinds of work, legal or illegal, usually 
based on their permit status.63 According to Shipper, this spills over 
into the types of crime that illegal immigrants might become involved 
in as a result of circumstance.64 Ishihara Shintaro confirms these ethnic 
associations by unabashedly deriding different groups in public.
The third mechanism that permits anti-multiculturalism is a long-
standing desire to preserve a myth of ethnic homogeneity and cultural 
uniqueness, also called nihonjinron. In the case of Ishihara, this implies 
that immigrants act not only as criminals, but also as agents capable of 
contaminating a pure ethnic Japanese identity. The source of crime can 
logically be reduced to the lack of a clear identity:
People who have entered illegally and who do not have clear identities 
will certainly cause riots…Crimes in Tokyo are getting more violent. If 
you ask who is committing them, they are all sangokujin. In other words, 
foreigners…who have entered illegally and remain in Japan are crimi-
nals, is that not so?65
In the cultural concept of nihonjinron, race, ethnicity, and nation are 
tightly bound up within the “theory of Japaneseness.” Sugimoto refers 
to the relative interchangeability of these three concepts as the “N-E-C 
Equation.”66 He argues that nihonjinron, which is based on “racial clas-
sifications and the state ideology of integration,” has been used to “not 
only mask ethnic minority issues in Japan but also its intra-national, 
non-ethnic variations and conflicts.”67 As a result, it has been used to 
preserve the “core of Japaneseness.” In light of this preoccupation with 
Japanese identity, which continues to play out on several platforms of 
life, including graphic art, pop culture, and literature, politicians can 
exploit these assumptions about core identity in attacking foreigners. 
Nihonjinron is not a new concept. It has been built into the social fabric 
of Japanese society for centuries, but now seems to manifest itself in 
the political rhetoric of anti-immigration.
Lastly, Ishihara generates wide appeal for his politics of anti-multi-
culturalism through his anti-elitism and populist media personality. As 
mentioned earlier, Ishihara’s general election campaign linked many 
old-style politicians with failure, saying that they had failed to stand 
up for Japan in the face of international pressures from the U.S. and 
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China. His personality, however, also shaped public consent. This view 
is best summed up by a voter interviewed by ABC News after the elec-
tion: “I wouldn’t have bothered voting if Ishihara hadn’t been running. 
He’s outspoken; he’s cool. I voted for his leadership.”68
IV. Comparative Conclusions: 
Cultural Discourses and Common Denominators
In light of the rise of anti-multicultural politics in both of these coun-
tries, each exhibits general characteristics in terms of how xenophobia 
can be justified to the general public and what the consequences are for 
immigrant realities.
A. Common Justifications: Essentialism and Populism
First, while the fault lines—social demarcations of the foreign and 
domestic—may differ, both the Netherlands and Japan draw upon 
an essentialized interpretation of identity that allows for protectionist 
measures. Pim Fortuyn based his claim on common Enlightenment 
principles, but ultimately argued that until a culture can subscribe to 
these universal principles, it is inferior and should not be allowed a 
presence in society. He framed fault lines in terms of values as opposed 
to other explicitly racialized causes. Unlike the universal prescriptions 
of the Netherlands, Japan’s identitarian myth is based on uniqueness; 
foreigners are discriminated against not because they have not under-
gone the necessary assimilation, but because they are incapable of 
doing so. Moreover, while values form a part of the Japanese identity, 
its fault lines extend into ethnicity and race, or “biological” traits. As 
the comparison with Japan shows, drawing fault lines based on either 
culture or ethnicity can have the same political consequences on immi-
gration and integration.
Second, nationalist politicians consistently rely on the logic of popu-
lism. The public support behind preserving an identity promulgated 
by Fortuyn, Wilders, and to a lesser extent Verdonk, rests on the per-
ceived failure of an outdated, incompetent group of political elites. 
Similarly, Ishihara Shintaro gained popularity in his campaigns by 
speaking out against old-style politicians and resonating with an iden-
tified common Japanese people. While their political platforms vary on 
other issues, the general tendency remains the same: national identity 
and populism complement each other and will likely continue as an 
Macalester International  Vol. 22
96
unavoidable symptom of both perceived disjunctures in the demo-
cratic process and the failure of the public imagination to come to 
terms with the many faces of globalization.69 Rightist populism now 
comes with a human face. The task is to sort through the appearance of 
politicians as humble citizens, some who even embody liberal charac-
teristics like homosexual rights, and the actual platforms and hostility 
they engender.
B. The Consequences of Xenophobia: An Immigrant’s Perspective
The standards of anti-multiculturalism in both countries can also be 
measured by the degree to which these constructions of foreigners have 
actual consequences on immigrant lives, and how these consequences 
are either ignored by the general public or overlooked in government 
policies. Constructions of all foreigners as backwards, dangerous, or 
illegal come at the dehumanizing expense of the many immigrants 
who live peaceably with their neighbors and remain active members 
of society. In Japan, I interviewed a Nigerian who sold trendy urban 
clothing at a boutique in Shibuya, the youthful shopping and enter-
tainment district of downtown Tokyo. When asked how he felt living 
in Japan, he explained to me that, “Life here is so much better than in 
Nigeria. So many people try and get over here for a new start, and I 
was lucky enough to be one of them.” He worked six days a week at 
the same store, and knew many other Nigerians in similar situations. 
I asked him about the perceptions of foreigners, particularly Africans, 
as criminals, and if he had an opinion on the subject. He said that he 
did not take that too seriously, and that he was “just happy to be living 
and working here, with a new life.” He also said that almost all of the 
people he knew from Africa “were not criminals, but people looking 
for a normal life like you and me,” and that “most Japanese people 
respected that when they get to know me.”
In populist discourses, the problems foreigners pose to general soci-
ety are always perceived as the consequence of their own doing, never 
in terms of long-standing or failed governmental policies on immigra-
tion and integration. While in Japan, I had the opportunity to inter-
view other individuals who were often the target of political attacks. 
I spoke with a Korean woman, who was a prostitute by night and a 
department store cashier by day, to get a better perspective on life as 
an illegal immigrant in Japan. She had come to Japan for economic 
employment because she had a cousin “who could get her over here 
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because she knew people.” She lived with three other women in an 
apartment building that had a large Korean and Thai immigrant popu-
lation. When asked why so many immigrants here stayed longer than 
their visas allowed, she contended it was a flaw in government policy, 
“not the fault of immigrants.” In another interview with several Indo-
nesian guest workers in the process of training for general custodial 
work in factories and restaurants, I discovered that they had traveled 
to Japan for a better life and were likely to stay even when their visas 
expired. They had taken classes for fifteen hours a day, six days a week, 
in order to be accepted into Japan’s guest worker program. Most had 
acquired a general proficiency in the Japanese language in a matter of 
three months. One man whom I spoke with on the subject of national-
ism and discrimination in Japan seemed to think that the problem was 
not the election of anti-immigrant politicians, but the fact that it was 
“becoming harder for people to come and work here, to live a better 
life than the one in Indonesia.”70 He asked me, “Why would I leave 
this country when they need me and I need them? It seems foolish.” 
Still, in Japan the media and political nationalism have contributed 
to general paranoia about the intentions of foreigners. According to a 
survey conducted by the Roper Center, the number of Japanese people 
who oppose the importation of foreign labor increased from 49.2% in 
2000 to 70.7% in 2004. Also, 72.5% picked the “deterioration of public 
safety” as the most important reason.71
Similarly, in the Netherlands the construction of Muslims as the 
primary threat to Dutch values has prevented the government and 
general society from making important distinctions between differ-
ent ethnic groups. In particular, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants 
exhibit very different tendencies in terms of integrating into the labor 
market and being prone to violent activity, particularly amongst male 
youths. In an interview with Jeroen Doomernik, an academic expert 
on comparative policies of immigration and integration, the Dutch 
government has yet to make any real distinction between types of 
Muslim communities, particularly between Moroccans and Turks.72 
According to his research, despite both Moroccans and Turks lagging 
behind their native Dutch peers in education and employment, several 
cultural variables had produced divergent trends between the two 
groups. As an illustration, Moroccan females typically outpace their 
Turkish counterparts in obtaining an advanced degree, while Moroc-
cans males seem to suffer from higher discrimination rates when seek-
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ing semi-skilled employment.73 Yet, populists have led many to reduce 
problems to Islam.
Dutch populism has also come at the expense of understanding 
the motivations of migrants and the risk of being an asylum seeker. 
In an interview with an immigrant named Karl74 from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, who works as a freelance sociologist as well as a 
banker for a major Dutch corporation, asylum seekers often choose 
to enter illegally and become involved in underground activities like 
drug dealing as a result of circumstance. He had lived in an asylum-
seeker center for several weeks doing research and noted a number of 
stressors in the asylum-seeking process. Among them is an inadequate 
living allowance, the possibility of a long wait to hear back on accep-
tance status, the inability to obtain meaningful employment or a degree 
from an accredited educational institution, and being forced into close-
quarter housing situations with people of radically different ages and 
lifestyles. According to him, people he knew who were once asylum 
seekers ended up selling drugs because they “didn’t have much of a 
choice” and were “forced to live this life.” Similarly, there was a lot of 
discontent amongst asylum seekers that the “government was baby-
ing the immigrants too much, that it was the state’s job to free people.” 
This caused problems because it meant that these immigrants had little 
responsibility over their own lives in terms of language acquisition or 
employment, but it also engendered a backlash within the Dutch pub-
lic when they became increasingly aware that their tax dollars were 
financing immigrants for extended periods of time. Karl felt that this 
helped give rise to politicians like Fortuyn and Wilders.
In both countries, similar responses have been voiced by immigrants 
concerning their situation and how it relates to anti-multicultural poli-
tics, whether they have chosen to make a living through illegal actions 
or simply came to these wealthy countries for a new start and the 
chance to obtain meaningful employment and a livable income. Their 
opinions suggest that if one is to take the realities of globalization seri-
ously, adding greater restrictions to immigrants and asylum seekers 
and increasingly deriding public displays of difference will likely lead 
to failure in theory and practice. This is not to suggest that borders and 
identities need to be eliminated, but that democratic societies need 
leaders who can responsibly direct public impulses away from racism 
or cultural intolerance and towards a common grammar of tolerance. 
This is also not to suggest that because immigrants are the targets of 
these political remarks their actions should automatically be shielded 
Jack Eisenberg
99
from any criticism. As the analysis of Fortuyn and Ishihara’s rise to 
fame indicates, their popularity was based to a certain extent on the 
ability to demonize other political leaders because they felt this right 
had been taken away.
V. Globalization and the State, Nationalism and Multiculturalism
I chose to explore the topic of nationalism because it not only presented 
unique theoretical and conceptual challenges, but its consequences 
seemed to be some of the most extreme for the people who remain 
“on the receiving end of globalization.” The task was to step outside 
of the Western analysis by comparing the Dutch political climate to the 
Japanese one. I drew from several debates existing in the canon of glo-
balization, particularly surrounding identity and multiculturalism, but 
did not expect to resolve my questions. Rather, I wanted to generate 
common characteristics in the ways political xenophobia takes shape 
in two countries, despite their historical and cultural differences, and 
to illustrate the complex ways in which democratic procedures reflect 
and refract global changes. This analysis has led me to conclude with 
several general remarks about understanding globalization.
First, immigration demands a responsible political and social 
response. In many ways, the task has already begun. My analysis 
portrays an extreme caricature of the path that two countries could 
continue to travel, that of demarcating clear and absolute boundaries 
between who has the legitimate right to belong to the society and who 
does not. In particular, the aforementioned politicians base their mem-
bership criteria on cultural factors, with little or no regard for the many 
other ways people coexist. While my analysis depicts a bleak picture, 
it should not overlook the numerous NGOs and local governments, 
social movements, and think tanks all involved in debate and dialogue 
about what immigration means for the host society. The political cli-
mate, now suited to populists, is only one manifestation of the many 
ways people can respond. Given the modest sampling of interview 
perspectives I was able to generate, it seems that as long as there is the 
possibility of living a better life in wealthy countries like Japan or the 
Netherlands, people will be migrating there whether it is legal or not.
Second, it has become clear that the new cultural fault lines many 
Western politicians employ have the same consequences as more tra-
ditional forms of racism. While Japan’s leaders based their discrimi-
natory measures on phenotypic and biological traits, Dutch political 
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leaders reduced differences to cultural or “mental” characteristics. The 
implication is clear: racism must be redefined if it is to be an effective 
pejorative claim against Western politicians. Many times politicians 
like Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, or Rita Verdonk are able to sidestep 
conventional understandings of racism because they invoke culture as 
opposed to ethnicity. An example of this is a speech in which Fortuyn 
called Islam “retarded” and then claimed, “it has nothing to do with 
racism, nothing with foreigner hatred.”75 Dutch politicians like For-
tuyn can avoid accusations of conventional racism by framing attacks 
on foreigners in terms of values, culture, and religion. Yet, if the conse-
quences of Japanese and Dutch actions are the same regardless of fault 
lines, then this confirms the claim of Pierre-Andre Taguieff that the 
new forms of European racism have evolved from biological traits to 
mental or cultural ones.76
Third, the nation-state remains a vital methodological tool in the 
literature on globalization. Ulrich Beck argues that the social sciences 
suffer from “methodological nationalism” and that people must no 
longer think of societies and polities as containers bounded by given 
territories.77 On the one hand, Beck is correct and academics need 
to think of social relations outside of their national communities. On 
the other hand, formal institutions confronting people on a day-to-
day basis exist through nation-states. States operate through legitimate 
procedures like national elections, and parliaments and their constitu-
tional safeguards are, by definition, of nations. If, following Beck, we 
are to look past methodological nationalism, then how do we deal with 
institutions like domestic electoral politics when gauging globaliza-
tion? The point here is that the unit of analysis is certainly important, 
but the context in which it is analyzed will likely have a far greater 
impact in enriching the literature on globalization. To be certain, this 
essay would not exist if I could not take the nation as a unit of analysis, 
although I have attempted to keep its significance within the broader 
scope of global changes.
The fourth related point is that there needs to be a much deeper look 
into the relationship between nation, state, and democratic institutions, 
in light of the changes globalization brings. One way these concepts 
have been bridged is the debate on multiculturalism. Multicultural 
theorists understand societies to be in constant cultural flux, and look 
to democracy as the means of securing peace and justice, albeit in 
very different ways. This literature, however, needs to be placed in 
the larger context of globalization and the nation-state. It thus seems 
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that there are two strands of political theory confronting globalization 
that are yet to confront one another: the macro-sociologists who take 
the nation-state, or what is becoming of it, as their unit of analysis, 
and the multiculturalists who take democratic institutions and cultural 
groups as their units of analysis. I hope I have helped bridge these two 
by acknowledging the links between electoral dynamics, international 
migration, and common discourses of anti-multiculturalism, but much 
further analysis and conceptual refinement is required.
Finally, any adequate political account of globalization will look 
deeply into the relationship between socioeconomic disparities, migra-
tion patterns, and the responses of host countries. It will hopefully 
engage larger theories of justice. It seems that although anti-multicul-
turalism takes place within a given country, identity politics can also 
be seen as a politics of space, or, to return to Bauman, the “global hier-
archy of mobility”:
The so-called ‘globalizing’ processes rebound in the distribution, of 
wealth and poverty, of resources and impotence, of power and power-
lessness, of freedom and constraint. We witness today the process of a 
world-wide restratification, in the course of which a new socio-cultural 
hierarchy, a world-wide scale, is put together.78
My encounters have taken me to people and places confronting both 
sides of the globalization coin. I have spent the past year of my life 
not only caught in its theoretical web, but living across and between 
national boundaries. I am certainly unable to draw a complete conclu-
sion about what the future will look like for many parts of the world. 
Yet this much is clear. The questions we must continue to ask of glo-
balization are: Who is powerless? How is this justified? How can it 
change? •
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